![]() The CCP is not changing its tactics, either. For a regime that has proclaimed the country’s entry into a “new era” of strength and power, there is no turning back to the old posture of low-key patience. The current pandemic, as big a challenge as it poses, is not a sufficient reason for Beijing to defer, abandon, or scale back its longstanding strategic goals. The CCP sees itself as locked in a perpetual struggle against hostile foreign forces, and believes that material strength is key but “discourse power” is needed to back it up. The CCP has long navigated between the two and learned to thrive on both, trying to mitigate threats to its survival while strengthening its international stature. Ambition and insecurity consistently go hand in hand as drivers of China’s external behavior. More often than is generally acknowledged, Beijing’s assertive behavior stems from a deep sense of fear. ![]() As Mao Zedong once said, “There is great chaos under heaven the situation is excellent.” ![]() Rather than seeing the situation as a pure setback, the Chinese leadership appears to understand the covid crisis and its attendant global disarray as a chance to seize new ground in the battle for international influence. Domestic critics of the Party’s management of the outbreak found themselves swiftly “harmonized” and “disappeared,” 2 but the gathering international backlash will not be so readily stopped. Xi publicly acknowledged this when, on 23 February 2020, he called the epidemic the “largest-ever public health emergency” the PRC had faced, and “a crisis and a big test” for the regime and the country alike.Ĭhina now faces an economic slowdown that threatens to be severe and protracted, and which may be accompanied by popular anger and social unrest. 1 The coronavirus-a “black swan” because it was unexpected and a “gray rhino” because it was initially ignored-represents a serious challenge for the CCP. In January 2019, Xi Jinping warned senior officials of the Central Party School to watch out for “black swans” and “gray rhinos,” but he was thinking more of the potential effects of the trade dispute with the United States and various familiar domestic challenges that could threaten the CCP’s survival. During today’s covid-19 crisis, it is yet again Beijing’s tool of choice. Shaping perceptions both at home and abroad is a central feature of the CCP’s strategic software. Creating an impression of forward momentum is also part of a narrative targeting the rest of the world: If China’s ascent is unstoppable, then resistance is futile. By showcasing its competence and appealing to national pride, the CCP seeks to bolster its legitimacy and perpetuate its rule at home. Propaganda and positive publicity are devices that authoritarian regimes, whose legitimacy does not stem from citizens’ votes, tend to use prodigally in order to help bolster their domestic authority. Xi has been eager to showcase the economic, military, and technological successes of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and to signify his regional and indeed global ambitions, notably through unveiling the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) not long after coming to power eight years ago.Ĭhina’s accomplishments are undeniable, but the leadership is keen on publicizing them for reasons that go beyond natural self-satisfaction. Her books include China’s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (2017).Īssertiveness and self-confidence are now the order of the day. Nadège Rolland is senior fellow in political and security affairs at the National Bureau of Asian Research in Washington, D.C.
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